

# “Taiwan’s Sovereignty” as the Pre-requisite for the Synthesis of Taiwanization and Sinicization

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## Abstract

Taiwan’s constitutional development since 1949 had undergone 3 stages, from Totalitarian Period (1949-1975), to Authoritarian Period (1976-1989), and finally to Democratic Period (1990-2010) including Party Rotation (2000-2008) ruled under DPP, and again in May, 2008 KMT won the ruling power. During Totalitarian and Authoritarian Period, “Sinicization” had been specially emphasized by government through mass media monopoly, and “Taiwanization” had been suppressed. However, in the period of 2000-2008, Taiwanization had been promoted by then ruling party DDP and pro-independence groups in Taiwan and overseas. But, from May 2008, KMT again promoted “Sinicization”, and hence on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2010’s by-election for Legislative Assembly, DPP won all three seats, and on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February’s by-election for Legislative Assembly again, DPP won 3 out of 4 seats, probably a symbol of Taiwanese warning against KMT’s over-Sinicization tendency.

Of course, Taiwanization is not only related Hoklo-dominant culture; it is also the multiculturalism, jointed by Taiwanese, Chinese and other cultures. In a society, different interest groups have their own say. However, “The Sovereignty of Taiwan” must be the pre-requisite of Taiwan-China relations including economic cooperation and even economic integration, Taiwanization and Sinicization can be synthesized only in the condition that “Taiwan’s Sovereignty” be retained, otherwise Taiwan will be unified by China, and this is the critical point that political parties and scholars ought to be noted.

**Keywords:** Taiwanization, Sinicization, sovereignty, multiculturalism

## Introduction

In their book entitled *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, Gabriel A. Almond and other authors use three levels of “system,” “Process,” and “Policy” for the analysis of political phenomena (Almond, et. al., 2010: 28-41). In this paper, I am also going to use the ideas of system, process, and policy to discuss the system level of national identity, the process level of democracy development, and the policy level of language, culture, and economy of Taiwan, and Taiwan-China relations across the Taiwan Strait with special emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Taiwan is divided along the lines of national identity (Taiwan identity versus China identity) and ethnicity. When Taiwan was ruled under totalitarianism and authoritarianism, ethnicity was an important rallying point for the opposition movement to mobilize the citizenry. But as Taiwan moved from authoritarianism to democracy, ethnicity lost some of its salience in politics, and instead, national identity became a much more important factor in dividing people into different political camps. To be sure, ethnicity and national identity are related, but they are not the same (Hsieh, 2008: 167).

Hoklo Taiwanese, Hakka Taiwanese, mainlanders, and aborigines are the four major ethnic groups in Taiwan. The first three groups are Han Chinese. Hoklo Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese refer to those whose ancestors came from mainland China to Taiwan many generations ago, whereas the mainlanders are those who themselves or whose parents or grandparents arrived in Taiwan recently—mostly in the late 1940s. The aborigines are of Austronesian stock, and can be subdivided into several smaller groupings, but their overall number is small.

Although the aborigines are frequently discussed as a single group of people, there are important differences in culture, customs, language, and ethnicity among the nine major tribes, which are the Ami, Atayal, Bunun, Paiwan, Puyuma, Rukai, Saisiyat, Tsou, and Yami (Roy, 2003: 3).

In Taiwan, people are commonly categorized according to their place of origin: Taiwan or the mainland. “Mainlanders” were born on the Chinese continent and came to Taiwan in the late 1940s or early 1950s to escape from communism. “Second generation Mainlanders” were born on Taiwan to parents who are Mainlanders. “Taiwanese” does not simply refer to everybody living in Taiwan. It is a term used to denote only those Han Chinese who already lived on Taiwan prior to the wave of migration that occurred at the end of the 1940s and their offspring (Wachman, 2008: 132).

The Fujian Chinese, who make up about 70 percent of the population, are the largest ethnic group in present day Taiwan. Their experience under Japanese colonial rule and Mainlander-dominated postwar Republic of China government, however, forged a strong “Taiwanese” identity among the Taiwan Fujianese. Decades of official repression of local language, culture, and history contributed to a huge increase, following the liberalization that began in the mid-1980s, in outward expressions of Taiwanese nationalism.

The Taiwanese people have shown a clear tendency in 1990s to move from having a Chinese identity toward exhibiting a Taiwanese identity. Regardless of ethnic background, age, educational level, gender, and partisan identity, the Taiwan people’s Chinese identity ratio has declined while their Taiwanese identity has risen sharply. On the whole, the changes have taken place gradually, characterized by a switch from the Chinese identity to the double identity and then a switch from the double identity to the Taiwanese identity (Ho & Liu, 2008: 300).

As Taiwan became democratic, local Taiwanese, as the majority of the population, naturally took over most of the major positions in government. As a result, ethnicity itself is no longer that salient in Taiwanese politics. Instead, national identity, referring to the future association between Taiwan and mainland China, has become the dominant cleavage dividing the population into different political groupings. On the one hand, there are people advocating an independent Taiwan completely separate from China. On the other, some believe that Taiwan and the mainland are integral parts of a larger China, and

should be politically reunified at a future date. There are still others favoring the status quo which is neither independence nor unification. This issue has become the dominant one in democratic Taiwan.

Culturally, the major difference among the three communities is the mother tongue. The two Taiwanese groups speak Hoklo and Hakka; two dialects spoken by people in southern Fukien and eastern Kwangtung in China. The mainlanders are a diverse group composed of people coming from all over China, speaking a variety of dialects. The difference in mother tongues led to controversy concerning whether Mandarin, a Peking dialect, should be promoted as national language. The practical solution to Taiwan's language policy could be Mandarin, Hoklo language and Haka language are all promoted as "official languages" while aboriginal languages be protected (Lee, 2004: 406).

Taiwanization refers to a multicultural, global and hybrid society with various ethnic groups and a high degree of diversity. Taiwanization imagined as civic rather than ethnic. Taiwanization is not only related Hoklo-dominant culture; it is also the multiculturalism, jointed by Taiwanese, Chinese and other cultures such as American culture, Japanese culture, Dutch culture and Spanish culture. In a society, different interest groups have their own say.

## Three Periods of Taiwan's Democracy Development

Taiwan's constitutional development since 1949 had undergone 3 stages, from Totalitarian Period (1949-1975), to Authoritarian Period (1976-1989), and finally to Democratic Period (1990-2010) including Party Rotation (2000-2008) ruled under DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), and again in May, 2008 KMT (Chinese National Party) won the ruling power.

According to political scientists, there are six features of totalitarian states:

### 1. An All-Encompassing Ideology

Totalitarians push an official theory of history, economics, and future

political and social development. The ideology portrays the world in black-and-white terms and claims to be building a perfect, happy society, so anyone against it is an “enemy of the people.” All are supposed to believe and study the official ideology.

## 2. A Single Party

Only one party legally existed, led by one man who establishes a cult of personality. Hierarchically organized, the party is either superior to or tied in with the formal institutions of government.

## 3. Organized Terror

Constitutional guarantees either did not exist or were ignored, thus making possible secret arrests, jailing, and torture. The security forces—sometimes called “secret police”—were often directed against whole classes of people. The threat of the “knock at the door” cows most of the population. Mass arrest and execution shows the state’s power and the individual’s helplessness.

## 4. Monopoly of Communications

The mass media in totalitarian states sells the official ideology and shows the system is working well under wise leaders. Only good news appears.

## 5. Monopoly of Weapons

Governments of totalitarian nations have a complete monopoly on weapons, thus eliminating armed resistance.

## 6. Controlled Economy

Totalitarian regimes, to control the economy, they make the state powerful, for resources can be allocated to heavy industry, weapons production, or whatever the party wishes (Roskin, et al., 2010: 106-108).

In this totalitarian period from 1949 to 1975, the KMT government had got nearly all these six features, and thus had controlled political ideology, education, mass media, economy, weapons, government officials and military. During this period, sinicization had been promoted and Taiwanization had been suppressed.

It is worthy to note that the KMT had lost China and escaped to Taiwan around 1949. When peace broke out in August 1945, the Nationalist armed forces were at least twice the size of the Chinese Communist Party's and moreover had the advantage of American equipment and supplies plus the assistance of the U.S. Navy in transporting troops and the U.S. Marines in the Tianchin-Peking area. The Nationalists held all of China's major cities and most of its territory. The spirit of the Cold War emerging in the United States as well as in China so American backing would obviously continue. In these circumstances, for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists to lose the civil war was a remarkable achievement. The reasons they lost were both stupidity on the battlefield and incompetence behind the lines (Fairbank, 1992: 331).

Authoritarian systems required only that citizens obey government edicts and limit their dissent (Ethridge & Howard, 2010: 13). The term authoritarianism and totalitarianism are often confused but have different meanings. Authoritarian regimes are governed by a small group—a party, a dictator, or the army—that minimizes popular input. They do not control everything. Many economic, social, religious, cultural, and familiar matters are left up to individuals. Most of the six points of totalitarianism discussed earlier are diluted or absent. Authoritarian regimes limit individual freedoms in favor of a hierarchical organization of command, obedience, and order. Citizens obey laws and pay taxes that they have no voice in establishing. Some trappings of democracy may exist for appearance sake. Elections confirm the rule of the dominant party; opponents have no choice, and some are arrested (Roskin, et al., 2010: 108-109).

During this Authoritarian period from 1976-1989, the KMT government continued to control official political ideology and important political positions.

The opposition forces had been suppressed, for instance, the Formosa incident of 1979, lots of democracy advocators had been put into prison. During this period, however, the Presbyterian Church still made its own distinctive move on August 16, 1977. Its leaders issued a document entitled “A Declaration of Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church on Taiwan.” It addressed President Carter and “all countries and Christian Churches throughout the world.” The Presbyterian Church Taiwan also addressed the leaders of the government and called upon the KMT-dominated regime to declare Taiwan a new and independent nation (Rubinstein, 2008: 166). During this period, sinicization had been promoted and Taiwanization had been suppressed as well.

Finally Taiwan had entered to Democratic Period (1990-2010) including Party Rotation (2000-2008) ruled under DPP, and again in May, 2008 KMT won the ruling power.

A number of initial, yet dramatic political reforms, including the termination of martial law, the legalization of new political parties, and a commitment to greater protection of civil liberties, occurred in the late 1980s. A second phase of reform in the 1990s involved constitution questions: the relative power of the president versus the premier, the composition and duties of the National Assembly, the procedure for electing the president, the status of the provincial level of government. Lee’s agenda could be generally described as a program to expand Taiwanese sovereignty. He continued to push toward further Taiwanization of government, supported direct election of the president and downsizing of provincial government and campaigned for greater international space for Taiwan in the international community (Roy, 2003: 183).

Lee pays attention to “popular sovereignty” and says: Today, the 21 million people in this country formally march into the new era of “popular sovereignty.” We have proved eloquently that the Chinese are capable of practicing democracy. “Whatever the people desire is always in my heart” I am full aware of the need of the people and I pledge myself to do my best to deserve their trust. This is the essence of the concept of “manage the Great Taiwan, nurture a new Chinese culture.” All the major cultures originated in a

very restricted area. Our 5,000-year-old Chinese culture also rose from a small region called Chung Yuan. Uniquely situated at the confluence of mainland and maritime cultures, Taiwan has been able in recent decades to preserve traditional culture on the one hand and to come into wide contact with Western democracy, science and modern business culture on the other. Equipped with a much higher level of education and development than in other parts of China, Taiwan is set to gradually exercise its leadership role in cultural development and take upon itself the responsibility for nurturing a new Chinese culture.

Managing the Great Taiwan can nurture not just a new culture, but also a new society. With political democracy, Taiwan's society has become robustly pluralistic. The Republic of China has always been a sovereign state. Dispute across the Strait center around system and lifestyle; they have nothing to do with ethnic or cultural identity. Here in this country it is totally unnecessary or impossible to adopt the so called course of "Taiwan independence." For over 40 years, the two sides of the Strait have been two separate jurisdictions due to various historical factors, but it is also true that both sides pursue eventually national unification." (Government Information Office, 1996: 81-89)

Lee Teng-hui's pragmatic diplomacy and constitutional reforms weakened the "One China policy." He broke through the last bottleneck impeding Taiwan's democratization by securing more international living space for economic and civil society. Lee eliminated most of the grievances complained of by social movements. He thus directed the attention of civil society to more constructive matters (Shiau, Chyuan-jenq, 1999: 114).

There were six times of constitution revisions between 1991 and 2000, and the agenda of Taiwan's constitutional debate, on the issues, the attitudes of the three major players can be identified: Lee Teng-hui (supported by the KMT mainstream), the DPP, and the New Party, stances of the KMT non-mainstream, who opposed President Lee on critical issues. The most important issues raised in the six constitutional reforms can be classified into the following

seventeen items: new constitution, plebiscite, local elections, provincial government, national assembly, control yuan, examination yuan, judicial yuan, direct election of president, legislative yuan, president electoral system, president-executive relations, presidential powers, national security council, electoral system, executive-legislative relations, and president-legislative relations (Lin, 2008: 132-4).

The seventh constitution revision came into effect on June 10, 2005. The five main points of the seventh revision are as follows:

1. Halving the number of seats in the legislature, from 225-113.
2. Changing the legislative term of office from three to four years.
3. Establishing a single-constituency, two-ballot system.
4. Abolishing the National Assembly and transferring the power to vote on constitutional amendments from National Assembly to the voters of Taiwan.
5. Transferring the power to impeach the president and the vice president to the grand justice (Office of the President, Republic of China, Constitution, [www.president.gov.tw](http://www.president.gov.tw)).

From the period from 2000-2008, Taiwanization had been promoted by then ruling party DDP and pro-independence groups in Taiwan and overseas. In his inauguration speech May 20, 2000, Chen Shiu-bian says: Taiwan stands up, demonstrating a resolute insistence on reason and a firm faith in democracy.

Taiwan stands up, representing the self-confidence of the people and the dignity of the country. Taiwan stands up, symbolizing hope for the realization of dreams.

I have always taken pride in being a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, but from the moment I take my oath and assume the presidency, I will put all my efforts into fulfilling my role as a “president for all

people.” “Rule by the clean and upright” has as its topmost priority the elimination of “black-gold”— the involvement of organized crime and moneyed interests in politics — and the eradication of vote-buying. . . . Today, I am willing to promise hereby that the new government will eliminate vote-buying and crack down on “black-gold” politics, so that Taiwan can rise above such sinking forces and ensure rule by the clean and upright. We must give the people a clean political environment.

The alternation of political parties does not mean an across-the-board negation of the past. We should be fair in evaluating the contributions made by those in power previously. Mr. Lee Teng-hui deserves our highest tribute and heartfelt gratitude for his promotion of democratic reforms and his excellent performance during his twelve years of leadership. We should understand that the government is no panacea for all ills. The driving force for economic development and social progress is the people. Over the past half-century, the Taiwanese people have toiled hard to create an economic miracle that has won global applause, and to lay the foundation for the survival and development of the Republic of China.

Today, facing the impact of the fast-changing information technologies and trade liberalization, Taiwan must move toward a knowledge-based economy. High-tech industries need to be constantly innovative, while traditional ones have to undergo transformation and upgrading. “Taiwan stands up, demonstrating a resolute insistence on reason and a firm faith in democracy.” (Government of Information Office, 2001: 9-12)

And there is a compromise of sovereignty between “Republic of China” and “Taiwan;” a compromise between KMT and DDP; a compromise between Taiwanization and Sinicization, and thus “sovereignty of Republic of China is sovereignty of Taiwan.” “President Chen’s Address to the National Day Rally 2004.10.10” Reads: “The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested with the 23 million people of Taiwan. The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. This is an indisputable fact. The Resolution 2758 of the 1971 UN General Assembly addresses the issue of

representation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the UN and relevant organizations. However, it never endows the PRC any right to "represent the people of Taiwan." It is essential that Resolution 2758 should not be wrongly used as an excuse to exclude Taiwan from the UN system. Misusing this resolution to obstruct the participation of Taiwan people not only violates the UN Charter, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and other international human rights principles; it is also the greatest irony to the principle of "universality of membership" (Mainland Affairs Council, 2005: 18-19).

From May 2008, KMT again promoted "Sinicization," as you can see in Ma-Ying Jiu's inaugural address as the following:

We will promote harmony among sub-ethnic groups and between the old and new immigrants, encourage healthy competition in politics, and respect the media's monitoring of the government and freedom of the press. I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seize this historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. Under the principle of "no unification, no independence and no use of force," as Taiwan's mainstream public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two sides reached a consensus on "one China, respective interpretations." Many rounds of negotiation were then completed, spurring the development of cross-strait relations.

I want to reiterate that, based on the "1992 Consensus", negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible. As proposed in the Boao Forum on April 12 of this year, let's "face reality, pioneer a new future, shelve controversies and pursue a win-win solution." This will allow us to strike a balance as each pursues its own interests. The normalization of economic and cultural relations is the first step to a win-win solution. Accordingly, we are ready to resume consultations.

It is our expectation that, with the start of direct charter flights on weekends and the arrival of mainland tourists in early July this year, we will launch a new era of cross-strait relations.

We will also enter consultations with mainland China over Taiwan's international space and a possible cross-strait peace accord. Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can cross-strait relations move forward with confidence. We have taken note that Mr. Hu Jintao has recently spoken on cross-strait relations three times: first, in a conversation of March 26 with U.S. President George W. Bush on the "1992 Consensus;" second, in his proposed "four continuations" on April 12 at the Boao Forum; and third, on April 29 when he called for "building mutual trust, shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-win solution" across the Taiwan Strait. His views are very much in line with our own. Here I would like to call upon the two sides to pursue reconciliation and truce in both cross-strait and international arenas. We should help and respect each other in international organizations and activities. In light of our common Chinese heritage, people on both sides should do their utmost to jointly contribute to the international community without engaging in vicious competition and the waste of resources. I firmly believe that Taiwan and mainland China are open-minded enough to find a way to attain peace and co-prosperity.

In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life. We care about the welfare of the 1.3 billion people of mainland China, and hope that mainland China will continue to move toward freedom, democracy and prosperity for all the people. This would pave the way for the long-term peaceful development of cross-strait relations (n.a., 2008).

As above quotation you can see, this is a rapprochement toward China. However, China insists on “One China Policy” and does not allow “one China, respective interpretations”. Ma ignores Taiwan’s sovereignty, and pays too much attention to 13 million people of mainland China.

We are suspicious about claims that after 2008, the state-sponsored Sinification same as the first decades of ROC rule over Taiwan has come back into existence. However, KMT Government’s state-sponsored Sinification is similar to that of totalitarian period (1949-1975) and authoritarian period (1976-1989). By comparison, the same point is they both pay special reference to Sinification. The different point is KMT is not able to reinforce signification successfully by the suppression of Taiwanization, as Taiwan has already entered into democratic period with different opinions. Taiwanization has not history yet, however, it has been strongly challenged by the KMT government’s overt pro-Sinification tendency.

And hence on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2010’s by-election for Legislative Assembly, DPP won all three seats of Taoyuan, Taichung, and Hualiang counties, and on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February’s by-election for Legislative Assembly again, DPP won 3 out of 4 seats: Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and Chiayi counties. Momentum is clearly on the DPP’s side, and this is probably a symbol of Taiwanese warning against KMT’s over-Sinicization tendency.

Recently, Taiwan has been arguing on the issue whether or not to sign ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) with China. To sign ECFA with China, Taiwan’s sovereignty will be undermined as ECFA sees Taiwan’s status as Hong-kong, a part of China. According to an opinion poll published by DDP on March, 25, 2010, 52.8% of Taiwanese people think that sign ECFA with China will damage Taiwan’s sovereignty while 36.8% of Taiwanese people do not think so. In addition to this, 82.1% of Taiwanese people think that sign ECFA is good for the rich merchants only, and 3.7% of Taiwanese people think that sign ECFA is good for the ordinary people (n.a., 2010a).

Ma Yin-Jiu and Tsai Ying-wen, Chairman of DPP had a televised debate on April 25, 2010 on whether Taiwan signing ECFA with China.

Tsai Ing-wen said the president's pro-Beijing policies had siphoned off Taiwanese resources and deepened commercial and trade reliance on China.

The two hours and 30minutes debate was aired live on Public Television Service, marking the first debate on policy between a president and an opposition party head in the nation's history.

In his opening statement, Ma pledged to uphold Taiwan's interests at all costs in negotiating an ECFA with China, an arrangement he described as essential to reviving Taiwan's trade competitiveness.

"If the ECFA talks do not secure overall economic benefits for Taiwan, I would not accept the agreement and would rather let it fall apart," Ma said.

For her part, Tsai said Ma's emphasis on the importance of signing an ECFA with China was based on a belief that "Taiwan can only gain access to the world via China." She challenged Ma to tell the public that this is Taiwan's "only choice" and that no other options exist. Once the agreement is signed, Taiwan will be required to open its market fully within a 10-year time-frame, Tsai said.

"But the president has yet to tell us how large the impact will be," she said.

Most attention was given to the 106 minutes question-and-answer session during which each asked the other five questions and five follow-up questions related to the trade deal. Accusing the government of creating a false sense of urgency in concluding an ECFA with Beijing, Tsai said China could have ulterior motives in making unilateral concessions to Taiwan in the talks. She also accused Ma's pro-China policy of having drained Taiwanese resources and deepened the nation's commercial and trade reliance on China.

In response, Ma said that his government has been ever-vigilant in opening Taiwan to China and expressed confidence that Taiwanese people are more than capable of dealing with any adverse impact from an ECFA with China. Ma said that rather than always blaming the government for keeping the opposition party in the dark on the pact, Tsai should instead order DPP lawmakers not to hinder legislative hearings on ECFA issues. Ma, however, failed to respond to Tsai's question on whether his administration has any backup plan if the ECFA talks with China break down.

In his questions, Ma said the DPP was responsible for the negative impression people have of the planned pact. In response, Tsai said public insecurity was real and not something any political party could conjure out of thin air.

Concerned that the terms of the agreement will not be reviewed by the Legislature before the deal is signed, Tsai asked Ma what would happen if the Legislature rejected an ECFA. "Will you redo it all over again?" she asked.

Ma sidestepped the question, but reasserted his administration's rationale for the pact. "Our strategy is to not let Taiwan be left behind.....We will be unable to meet the challenges ahead or cope with the international situation if we do not sign the ECFA," he said (*Taipei Times*, 2010).

## Sovereignty of Taiwan

There are four main approaches to the question of Taiwan's suspending sovereignty. Each approach draws support from the political camp that espouses a corresponding sense of national identity. The first approach was largely supported by the orthodox KMT and argues that Taiwan's sovereignty resides with the ROC. The second position is espoused by the PRC, which claims that Taiwan was restored to China in 1945. Since Taiwan is part of China, Taiwan should revert to the successor state of China which is PRC.

The third standpoint is principally championed by those who favor an independent Taiwan and argues that the future of Taiwan should be decided by a referendum. If the people want an independent Taiwan, then the government should conform to that result and seek international recognition as the Republic of Taiwan. Each of the above three positions has its own supporters across the Taiwan Straits. However, the problem is how most countries in the international community look at the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. This provides a fourth outlook on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty. This approach argues that because of the imperialistic nature of Taiwan's seizure by Japan, when Japan renounced sovereignty, the status of Taiwan's sovereignty was left unsolved. In settling such questions, principles of self-determination, human rights and democracy are considered a priority in the international community (Chiu, 2001: 162-64).

The conflict between competing views of national identity has been a central characteristic of political life in Taiwan (Wachman, 2008: 126). The KMT has based its monopoly over Taiwan's political system on its claim to be the legitimate government of all China, temporarily squeezed into one province (Gold, 2008: 88).

The deepening of economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China, the settlement of an increasingly larger number of Taiwanese businessmen and migrants in the mainland, and the emergence of a Mandarin-based media industry across the Straits will certainly complicate the consolidation of Taiwanese identity. Most fundamentally, an elite-orchestrated Taiwanese nation-building project will inevitably run into a head-on collision with a state-orchestrated Chinese nationalism on the mainland (Chu, 2008: 50).

To sum up, the attitude of Taiwan's and China's major political parties in relation to sovereignty are as follows:

KMT: China Identity, ROC, pro unification; One China with different interpretations.

DPP: Taiwan identity, a new sovereign country, pro independence; Taiwan and China are two different countries.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP): One China policy, one country two systems.

Some of others: Status Quo.

Taiwan's leaders need to think about Taiwan in terms of de-colonization rather than in terms of unification and independence. By far the vast majority of countries around the world have experienced colonization and they often have expressed support for other countries undergoing the decolonization process. Taiwan needs to explain to the world that Taiwan's so called "one China" policy of Taiwan was established under the colonial dictatorship of Chang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, and that the Taiwanese people had no say in that matter. Taiwan needs to explain to the world that it is undergoing a process of "decolonization" (Jacobs, 2010: 32).

## Conclusion

Taiwan's constitutional development since 1949 had undergone 3 stages, from Totalitarian Period (1949-1975), to Authoritarian Period (1976-1989), and finally to Democratic Period (1990-2010) including Party Rotation (2000-2008) ruled under DPP, and again in May, 2008 KMT won the ruling power.

During Totalitarian and Authoritarian Period, "sinicization" had been specially emphasized by government through mass media monopoly, and "Taiwanization" had been suppressed. However, in the period of 2000-2008, Taiwanization had been promoted by then ruling party DDP and pro-independence groups in Taiwan and overseas. But, from May 2008, Taiwanization had been strongly Challenged by KMT's over pro-Sinicification tendency.

Of course, Taiwanization is not only related Hoklo-dominant culture; it is also the multiculturalism, jointed by Taiwanese, Chinese and other cultures. In a society, different interest groups have their own say. However, “The Sovereignty of Taiwan” must be the pre-requisite of Taiwan-China relations including economic cooperation and even economic integration, Taiwanization and Sinicization can be synthesized only in the condition that “Taiwan’s Sovereignty” be retained, otherwise Taiwan will be unified by China,

China is hostile toward Taiwan, and the expanding cross-strait relations raise serious security questions, particular for Taiwan. Many analysts have expressed growing concern that China might be able to exploit these expanding economic ties as powerful levers of influence to pressure Taiwan politically (Tanner, 2007: 2).

It is worth to note that China is not a democratic country. “China today is dramatically different from Taiwan, then and now” (Diamond, 2008: 256). And therefore, Taiwan had better maintain its sovereignty and avoid politically Sinicized.

What the majority of the population of Taiwan wants in the future is probably a relation with the People’s Republic of China comparable to the relation between the United States and the United Kingdom: close ties reflecting history, language, and culture, but separate national identities and sovereignties.

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# 臺灣主權是臺灣本土化與中國化結合的先決條件

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## 摘要

自 1949 年迄今，臺灣憲政民主的發展歷經三個階段：(一) 極權主義時期 (1949-1975)；(二) 威權主義時期 (1976-1989)；(三) 民主政治時期 (1990-2010) 包括 (2000-2008) 政黨輪替，由民進黨執政，及 2008 年 5 月之後國民黨重新執政。

在極權主義時期及威權主義時期，政府透過大眾傳播獨占，極力倡導中國化，而壓制本土化。然而，在 2000-2008 期間，當時執政的民進黨以及臺灣海內外傾向獨派的團體則力倡臺灣本土化。但是 2008 年 5 月之後，國民黨再度極力倡導中國化，過度傾中，以致於 2010 年 1 月 9 日的立法委員補選，民進黨贏得全部的三個席次；2 月 27 日的立委補選，民進黨贏得 4 席當中的 3 席，顯示出現臺灣民眾對於國民黨過度傾中政策不滿的警訊。

當然，臺灣本土化不只是福佬為主的文化而已；臺灣本土化指的是多元文化主義，包含了臺灣文化，中華文化以及其它文化。在社會上，不同的利益團體有自己的聲音。但是，臺灣主權必定是臺灣和中國關係的先決條件，包括經濟合作甚至於經濟整合，都是如此。臺灣本土化和中國化的結合，只有在臺灣主權維護的情況之下才有可能，否則臺灣將被中國統一。此關鍵性要點是政黨，學者們所宜注意的。

**關鍵詞：**臺灣本土化、中國化、主權、多元文化主義